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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The determinative authority for this appeal is Sanderson v. 
First Security Leasing Co., 201 Utah Advance Report 18 (Utah 1992). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
West One's argument ignores Kirberg's statement that she was 
trained and taught, as a branch manager, that West One had a policy 
of only terminating "for-cause". Instead, West One relies solely 
upon its written disclaimers. However, oral statements can modify 
even written disclaimers of at-will employment. A jury should 
decide whether that occurred here. 
West One cannot put a fine-print boilerplate provision in its 
employee application prohibiting later modification or waiver. 
Parties always remain free to re-define their contractual 
relationship. Kirberg should be allowed to show that this happened 
here. Finally, whether Kirberg should have been fired is a 
disputed question, which should go to the jury. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WEST ONE IGNORES KIRBERG'S TESTIMONY 
BUT RELIES SOLELY ON ITS WRITTEN DISCLAIMERS 
A written at-will contract of employment can be modified by 
subsequent conduct and promises, not just by subsequent written 
contract. Hodgson v. Bunzi Utah, Inc., 202 U.A.R. 22 (Utah 1992): 
Therefore, evidence of conduct and oral statements may 
establish an implied-in-fact contract, even without the 
support of written policies, bulletins, or handbooks. 
Id., at 23. Accord, Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997 
(Utah 1991) . 
West One dismisses Kirberg's testimony, and focuses only on 
its written disclaimers. This pick-and-choose approach to 
conflicting evidence is the prerogative of the jury, not that of 
the court. Actually, West One does not directly contradict 
Kirberg's assertions that she was trained and taught as a branch 
manager that West One only fired for-cause. It only argues that 
such specific training and teaching is not "sufficiently clear and 
unambiguous" to modify the employment relationship. On the 
2 
contrary, Kirberg's statement that she was taught and trained in 
West One's for-cause termination policy is "clear and unambiguous". 
1
 A jury could look into her eyes and believe it. A jury should 
be given that opportunity. 
POINT II 
WEST ONE IGNORES CASE LAW SUPPORTING 
KIRBERG'S RELIANCE UPON ITS ORAL PROMISES 
West One's pick-and-choose approach to the evidence is 
followed by its pick-and-choose approach to Utah case law. West 
One carefully omitted any discussion in its brief of Sanderson v. 
First Security Leasing Co., 201 Utah Advance Report 18 (Utah 1992). 
Sanderson held that a single oral statement of an employer was 
sufficient to modify a written at-will employment contract. Id. at 
20. Sanderson was hired under a written at-will contract. But 
Sanderson alleged that his employer later told him that he would 
not be fired for absenteeism. Sanderson held that this precluded 
his employer from later firing him for absenteeism. The Sanderson 
court declared: 
If West One wanted more details, it should have asked more 
questions when deposing Kirberg. 
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At-will employment is a bundle of different privileges, 
any or all of which an employer can surrender through an 
oral agreement. In addition to a promise for a specified 
employment term or a for-cause requirement for 
termination, an employer can, for example, agree to use 
a certain procedure for firing employees or promise not 
to fire employees for a certain reason, thereby modifying 
the employee's at-will status. 
Id. at 20 (emphasis added). Like Sanderson, a jury could easily 
find that West One's oral representations to Kirberg surrendered 
the at-will privileges emphasized above. 
West One relies only upon Hodgson, and Johnson to support its 
argument that it can teach and train a manager that employees can 
only be fired for cause, and later claim no obligation to be held 
to those teachings. But West One ignores critical factual 
differences between Hodgson, Johnson, and Kirberg. Hodgson and 
Johnson relied simply upon the written employee handbooks, and 
employer conduct consistent with those handbooks, Kirberg relies 
upon much more. 
Kirberg was taught and trained, as a branch manager, that West 
One's policies forbade arbitrary firing, without established and 
documented good cause. Johnson and Hodgson were apparently line 
employees, not in a position to be trained in company policy 
regarding termination. Kirberg was a branch manager with employee 
termination responsibilities. Kirberg was in a position to know 
what West One's policies really were. Hodgson was expressly told 
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that her hiring was "at-will". Kirberg was never told any such 
thing. 
Hodgson and Johnson simply observed employer actions that were 
consistent with the handbook. Kirberg was herself in a position to 
act to make employee termination decisions, and she was told she 
could not fire without cause. Hodgson and Johnson were never told 
how the employee handbooks were to be interpreted or used. Kirberg 
was told that the employee handbooks were binding, and used to 
create a progressive system of discipline, based upon a for-cause 
standard of termination. 
West One followed a course of conduct which included oral 
training to create an understanding that employees had job 
security. All the while, West One claims to secretly have intended 
to rely upon the fine-print disclaimers in the employee handbook, 
employee application, and ethics booklet. The employers in 
Johnson, Hodgson, and Sanderson were not so brazen in their 
manipulation of employees. West One's conduct should not receive 
this court's condonation. 
POINT III 
WEST ONE'S "ANTI-MODIFICATION" PROVISION 
COULD ITSELF BE MODIFIED 
West One's fine print contained a provision designed to 
prevent anyone from claiming a modification or waiver of the 
written at-will provisions of its contract. A contract that cannot 
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be modified is a theoretical impossibility. Parties always remain 
free to modify or change their contracts. Suppose Kirberg had a 
written promise not to be fired from the president of West One. 
According to West One, it would be unenforceable, since no company 
representative has authority to change the at-will contract. 
This anti-waiver or anti-modification language is conceptually and 
practically no different from that at issue in Hardy v. Prudential 
Ins. Co. of America, 763 P.2d 761, 768 (Utah 1988). The same 
result should follow. 
POINT IV 
A JURY COULD FIND THAT KIRBERG 
WAS NOT FIRED FOR CAUSE 
West One picks its best evidence to argue that Kirberg was 
terminated for cause. Of course, Kirberg's evidence and the 
inferences drawn from it were to the contrary. The trial court 
correctly realized that this question was for the jury, and did not 
accept West One's argument. 
CONCLUSION 
Kirberg was given an employee manual with a progressive system 
of discipline inside. She was told to follow it. She was told and 
trained that West One only fired employees for cause. Kirberg 
believed it. In fact, until it fired Kirberg, West One followed 
this policy of for-cause termination. 
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Despite Kirberg*s good faith and trust, West One decided to 
fire her without cause. When Kirberg sued, West One trotted out 
every disclaimer it could locate. Despite the fact that Kirberg 
was never informed of the fine print disclaimers, West One now 
claims that these overrode the oral representations, written 
employee manual, and termination practices it followed. Employee 
rights should not be subverted by such conduct. If a jury believes 
Kirberg, West One should be held accountable in damages. The 
summary judgment should be reversed, and the case remanded for 
trial. 
DATED this / day of March, 1993. 
Daniel F. Bertch 
3540 South 4000 West, Suite 100 
West Valley City, UT 84120 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / day of March, 1993, I served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S 
REPLY BRIEF upon the following, by depositing four copies thereof 
in the United States mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Elizabeth Dunning 
Carolyn Cox 
Watkiss, Dunning & Watkiss 
111 East Broadway, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
SL 
Daniel F. Bertch 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,,IltJ AND, FOR 
SALT L/iKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAIJ 
PATRICIA J. KIRBERG, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WEST ONE BANK, 
Defendant. 
MINUTED ENTRY 
Ca s eS NoTi; 9T0 9 016 4 0 CV 
JUDGEiFRANKuG? »NOEL 
Now before the Court is defendant West One BanKrS Motion«, for 
Summary Judgment. The Court has reviewed the memos ^and 
affidavits filed in connection therewith* has heard^oral 
argument and having taken the matter under advi'sement now-rules 
as follows: 
It is clear to the Court ^that the; initial emplovment 
relationship between plaintiff and de|fenfant Under] the facts of 
this case was an "at-will" employment ji^relatronsHiD. The 
question before the Court is whether there is sufficient" facts 
to create a triable issue as to whether the parties intended to 
modify the employment relationship to limit the defendant's 
KIRBERG V. WEST ONE BANK PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
ability to terminate plaintiff. Kirberg argues that certain 
conduct of the defendant and certain procedures set out in the 
employee manuals created an implied-in-fact contract f providing 
that she could be terminated only for good uamae. 
It is important to note that the application signed by 
plaintiff and the employment manual in effect throughout 
Kirberg's employment 'contained disclaimers expressly stating 
that she could be discharged without notice and without cause, 
that there was no express or implied employment contract between 
her and the company and further that adherence to the policies 
and guidelines contained in the code of conduct did not 
constitute an expressed or implied contract• The Court has 
reviewed the facts which plaintiff relies on to support her 
claim that in spite of the disclaimers there was an implied in 
fact contract between plaintiff and defendant and that could be 
terminated only for good cause. The Court finds those facts 
relied on by plaintiff to be insufficient to create a triable 
issue of fact as to an implied in fact contract and therefore 
grants defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Counsel for defendant is to prepare an orderv consistent with 
this ruling and submit it to the Court; for signature, 
DATED this Q/M ^ day of June, 1992. 
FRANK G.]» 
DISTRICT' 
AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICIA KIRBERG 
iv 
FILES 
DISTRICT G0UR1 
>?3 2 3^H'9Z 
T.- .uj " :.. :1AL DISTRICT 11
 S l ' u . t CCUIiTY 
rQM* Daniel F. Bertch, A4728 3540 South 4000 West, Suite 100 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: (801) 967-7406 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA J. KIRBERG, 
Plaintiff, 
WEST ONE BANK, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICIA J. KIRBERG 
Case No. 910901640 CV 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
: SS, 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Patricia J. Kirberg, having been duly sworn, states and 
alleges under oath as follows: 
1. I am the plaintiff in this matter, and have personal 
knowledge of the following. 
2. I never read the disclaimer of implied terms or the 
disclaimer of requirement of just cause when I was hired as a 
teller. It was simply included in the forms I was to fill out. It 
was never referred to in the employment interview, and there was no 
statement made to me that I could be fired without cause. 
3. The disclaimers given me when I was hired as a teller 
were never referred to again, in either my own employment, or the 
employment of others. 
4. I received no further disclaimers, except that sometime 
in 1990, a code of ethics booklet was distributed to all employees. 
There was no discussion of the specifics of the booklet with 
anyone, and especially not concerning any disclaimer relating to 
any right to fire employees without cause. 
5. The code of ethics disclaimer was never referred to again 
in either my own employment, or the employment of others. 
6. As branch manager, my duties included personnel issues in 
my branch. This in turn included employee discipline and 
termination issues. 
7. I was given a Human Resource Policy Manual, to use in 
employee matters involving employees under me. A copy of a portion 
of the Manual entitled "Dismissal" is attached to this affidavit. 
8. The Human Resource Policy Manual sets forth a system of 
progressive steps of employee discipline, including supervisory 
counseling, verbal warning, written reprimand, probation, 
suspension and dismissal. 
9. The Manual advises that the severity of the problem is 
related to the degree of discipline. The understanding I drew from 
the Manual, the employee discipline practices I observed, and the 
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advice and training I received as a branch manager was that the 
discipline should be at the lightest (least) level necessary to 
correct the problem. 
10. Further, I understood, and was trained, that an 
employee's problems needed to be fully documented or proved before 
they could be disciplined, to justify the severity of any action 
taken. 
11. It was my understanding from the practices I observed, 
and I was taught, that an employee was not fired arbitrarily or 
without cause. I cannot think of a single instance where this 
happened. 
12. There were at least two instances where I wanted to 
dismiss an employee under her for poor judgment and/or performance, 
but I was told she could not by my superiors. Instead, I was told 
that I must first counsel the employee, and warn them. In one 
instance, the employee was simply not showing up for work. This 
person was ultimately transferred to another department. 
13. The only instance where someone under me was dismissed, 
involved someone who admitted to stealing customer's money. Even 
this dismissal did not come until after the employee personally 
confessed; prior to the confession, I was not allowed to dismiss 
her. 
14. At the time I submitted Dr. Davis' loan applications, I 
3 
had no knowledge of his problems with the State of Utah, with his 
former employees, or with his patients. 
15. Dr. Davis solicited the lo&n applications that I 
forwarded, and he satisfied the normal credit guidelines for 
approving loans by the loan processing center. The applications do 
not ask if a person has ever had any charges brought against them, 
or ever been accused of overcharging a customer. In fact, we were 
told not to inquire about other personal information, other than 
what was on the application form. 
16. I did hear an unsubstantiated rumor in November, 1990, 
about Dr. Davis being charged with rape, overcharging customers and 
unspecified Medicaid regulation violations. I was told that all 
the problems had been resolved in the past, and specifically, that 
any criminal charges had been dismissed. I understood the problems 
to be at least several years old. 
17. At the time I heard these rumors (in November, 1990), I 
did not know if it were true. However, to protect West One, I 
checked Dr. Davis1 loans, and found that they were all current. 
18. To the best of my knowledge, Dr. Davis' loans with West 
One are, and have been, current at all times. In fact, the only 
loan made to Dr. Davis after I heard the rumors, of $30,000.00, was 
paid off in February, 1992. 
19. In January, 1991, Dr. Davis sought another loan to re-
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finance his business obligations. 
20. At the time of Dr. Davis1 application for all his loans, 
branch managers were directed to submit loan applications to Tim 
Conklin, a loan officer, for his review. Accordingly, I referred 
Dr. Davis* loan application to Tim Conklin for his review and 
approval. 
21. Subsequently, in January, 1991, I was told by my daughter 
that the FBI was in Dr. Davis' office. I immediately called 
Conklin, and told him to be cautious in deciding whether to give a 
loan to Dr. Davis. I explained to him that the FBI was apparently 
investigating Dr. Davis. 
22. The unsubstantiated rumor I heard about Dr. Davis was not 
enough to have called the existing loans, nor did Dr. Davis1 
objective financial situation warrant any action on my part. 
23. At the time that I submitted Dr. Davis* loans, and up to 
and including my dismissal, West One had no policy barring loans to 
anyone who had ever been charged with rape, but had the charges 
dismissed later. No customer was ever asked this question. 
24. At the time that I submitted Dr. Davis* loans, and up to 
and including my dismissal, West One had no policy barring loans to 
anyone who had ever been accused of overcharging by a disgruntled 
customer. No customer was ever asked this question. 
25. At the time that I submitted Dr. Davis' loans, and up to 
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and including my dismissal, West One had no policy barring loans to 
anyone who had ever been accused of violating governmental business 
regulations. No customer was ever asked this question. 
26. The only prior occasions when I received discipline were 
for security problems with the people under me. Specifically, the 
employees involved had failed to lock an outer vault door on one 
occasion, and failed to lock a cash drawer on another. 
27. The risk to the bank from these prior incidents was much 
greater than the risk it faced from Dr. Davis1 loans. However, I 
received only a written reprimand from these prior instances. 
28. In my three years of employment with West One, I had 
observed a number of situations where an employee had been asked to 
make a judgment call, and in hindsight, had made the call the wrong 
way. None of these employees were dismissed, even though it cost 
the bank money on some occasions. 
29. It is my belief that my decision not to pass on 
unsubstantiated rumors about claims made regarding a medical 
doctor's past conduct was a judgment call on my part. I felt that 
I owed it to Dr. Davis not to spread rumors that might have been 
very damaging, and very false. 
30. Whether my judgment was right or wrong, it was not 
sufficient grounds to dismiss me, when judged against the prior 
instances of dismissal of West One employees. 
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FURTHER, AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this 2£. day of March, 1992. 
<-his £3 day of March, 
aau»-*i»-««W»--to before me this o^_ * 
S U B S C H t t W - ^ ^ ^ T A B Y PUBLIC ^^—p , ^ ~7 
1Q92 X ^ % v STATE OF UTAH \ / I . I / l * ^ -
l ^ ^ z . /*7>!Siftsr<a\ u.rvmmKKionExams / ^ a .. „ -Jf 7 .A i X ^ ^ •— 
NOTARY P I
ST TE F T  
Kty Commission Expires 
September 17 1995 
RANDEEROUSE 
3540 South 4000 Wes.1. Sale 100 
WeslVttey City, Utah 84120 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: 
1^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the Is) day of March, 1992, I served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICIA J. 
KIRBERG upon the following, by depositing copies thereof in the 
United States mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Elizabeth Dunning 
Carolyn Cox 
Watkiss & Saperstein 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Daniel F. Bertch 
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JMEFINANCL ^AOUP/HUMAN kESOUk^E POUC\ MANUAL 
MPLOYEE RELATIONS Discipline HRPM 130 
;ORPORATE POLICY 
Employees of Moore Financial Group whose Job performance or conduct Is 
lubstandard or who violate corporate or affiliate policies, practices, or 
regulations are subject to disciplinary action. Depending on the severity of 
he problem, disciplinary action may result In progressive discipline, a 
Negotiated voluntary separation, or immediate Involuntary separation. 
The company encourages harmonious working relationships among 
lupervlsors and employees. If possible, problems should be resolved on an 
Informal basis . If more serious action is appropriate1, the following 
disciplinary actions should be considered. 
• Supervisory counseling 
• Verbal warning 
• Written reprimand 
• Probation 
• Suspension 
• Dismissal. 
Written documentation of the problem and the actions taken to correct It are 
ftelpful as a basis for avoiding misunderstanding of the issues involved, 
establishing a record of corrective action agreed upon, and knowing If the 
problem has been resolved or If more progressive disciplinary action Is appro 
prlate. Documentation Is also helpful as a basis for fair and honest perfor-
mance evaluations. 
CORPORATE GUIDELINES 
HH forms of disciplinary action, be they counseling sess ions, verbal 
warnings, reprimands, probation, suspension and-or dismissals should be 
Documented by the immedlte supervisor. Contact your appropriate Human 
[Resource department for assistance In carrying through disciplinary action. 
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ANCIAL 
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I to take into account in determining your job placement? If yes. please describe any specific reasonable accommodations MFGI can make that would assist you in working here 
VES 
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YES G T N O 
A conviction wtN nor nacessanty oar applicant from amptoyment 
iy comoanv has ever refused to issue a bond for you. please explain (include name of the bonding company and when this happened) 
)u have ever been terminated from employment, please explain 
>o 
ase explain your career interests and goals and any particular interest you have in banking and employment with Moore Financial Group 
\fllff(Ctl' ° * l^ttiLsiJ pCCS&tf. CQ^tt. itLsirs /;>J?U.y JLC/>C/A 
f*4/ y <"<•/ y/tLA.7 (£sncs MJLt, <^ /&*<L**^U.y 
lucational records pertaining to my attendance, course work ana other school activities authorize the release of all high school, college, or other ed ti i 
further consent to the disclosure of any and all information about me contained in private and government files relevant to this application for employment 
r relating to my present and former employment history, and I request all present and former employers and federal, state and local government agencies 
t supply this information to you on your request You are also authorized to make any investigation of my personal history and financial and credit record 
uough any Investigative or credit agencies or bureaus of your choice 
hereby ask my present and former employers to furnish you any personnel information you request and I release my present and former employers from 
ny liability that may arise as a result of their providing this information to Moore Financial Group. 
understand and agree that if I am employed by Moore Financial Group or any of its related companies or subsidiaries (the "company"), that I may resign 
may be discharged at any time without notice and without cause I understand no company representative has any authority to enter into an agreement 
.h me diflerent or contrary to the foregoing I also understand that if I accept employment, there is no express or implied employment contract between 
Tie and the company I agree to comply with all of the company's policies and procedures 
~~~iiis«citirtn are-true and complete I understated that misrepresentations or ^ falsification^ Btd|em|nys mac 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / day of March, 1993, I served 
four true and correct copies of the foregoing ADDENDUM TO 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF upon the following, by depositing copies 
thereof in the United States mails, postage prepaid, addressed as 
follows: 
Elizabeth Dunning 
Carolyn Cox 
Watkiss & Saperstein 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
l^ i 
Daniel F. Bertch 
vi 
